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Abstract. We present a new scheme for quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion which is compact and allows for efficient evaluation of arbi-
trary polynomial-sized quantum circuits. Building on the framework of
Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] and recent results in the area of instanta-
neous non-local quantum computation [Spe15], we show how to construct
quantum gadgets that allow perfect correction of the errors which occur
during the homomorphic evaluation of T gates on encrypted quantum
data. Our scheme can be based on any classical (leveled) fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE) scheme and requires no computational assump-
tions besides those already used by the classical scheme. The size of our
quantum gadget depends on the space complexity of the classical decryp-
tion function – which aligns well with the current efforts to minimize the
complexity of the decryption function.
Our scheme (or slight variants of it) offers a number of additional
advantages such as ideal compactness, the ability to supply gadgets “on
demand”, and circuit privacy for the evaluator against passive adver-
saries.
Keywords: Homomorphic encryption · Quantum cryptography · Quan-
tum teleportation · Garden-hose model
1 Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is the holy grail of modern cryptography.
Rivest et al. were the first to observe the possibility of manipulating encrypted
data in a meaningful way, rather than just storing and retrieving it [RAD78].
After some partial progress [GM84,Pai99,BGN05,IP07] over the years, a break-
through happened in 2009 when Gentry presented a fully-homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme [Gen09]. Since then, FHE schemes have been simplified
[VDGHV10] and based on more standard assumptions [BV11]. The exciting
developments around FHE have sparked a large amount of research in other
areas such as functional encryption [GKP+13a,GVW13,GKP+13b,SW14] and
obfuscation [GGH+13].
Developing quantum computers is a formidable technical challenge, so
it currently seems likely that quantum computing will not be available
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immediately to everyone and hence quantum computations have to be out-
sourced. Given the importance of classical1 FHE for “computing in the
cloud”, it is natural to wonder about the existence of encryption schemes
which can encrypt quantum data in such a way that a server can carry
out arbitrary quantum computations on the encrypted data (without inter-
acting with the encrypting party2). While previous work on quantum homo-
morphic encryption has mostly focused on information-theoretic security (see
Sect. 1.2 below for details), schemes that are based on computational assump-
tions have only recently been thoroughly investigated by Broadbent and
Jeffery. In [BJ15], they give formal definitions of quantum fully homomorphic
encryption (QFHE) and its security and they propose three schemes for quantum
homomorphic encryption assuming the existence of classical FHE.
A natural idea is to encrypt a message qubit with the quantum one-time pad
(i.e. by applying a random Pauli operation), and send the classical keys for the
quantum one-time pad along as classical information, encrypted by the classical
FHE scheme. This basic scheme is called CL in [BJ15]. It is easy to see that
CL allows an evaluator to compute arbitrary Clifford operations on encrypted
qubits, simply by performing the actual Clifford circuit, followed by homomor-
phically updating the quantum one-time pad keys according to the commuta-
tion rules between the performed Clifford gates and the Pauli encryptions. The
CL scheme can be regarded as analogous to additively homomorphic encryption
schemes in the classical setting. The challenge, like multiplication in the classical
case, is to perform non-Clifford gates such as the T gate. Broadbent and Jef-
fery propose two different approaches for doing so, accomplishing homomorphic
encryption for circuits with a limited number of T gates. These results lead to
the following main open problem:
Is it possible to construct a quantum homomorphic scheme that allows
evaluation of polynomial-sized quantum circuits?
1.1 Our Contributions
We answer the above question in the affirmative by presenting a new scheme
TP (as abbreviation for teleportation) for quantum homomorphic encryption
which is both compact and efficient for circuits with polynomially many T gates.
The scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks from quantum adversaries,
as formalized by the security notion q-IND-CPA security defined by Broadbent
and Jeffery [BJ15].
Like the schemes proposed in [BJ15], our scheme is an extension of the
Clifford scheme CL . We add auxiliary quantum states to the evaluation key which
we call quantum gadgets and which aid in the evaluation of the T gates. The
size of a gadget depends only on (a certain form of) the space complexity of the
1 Here and throughout the article, we use “classical” to mean “non-quantum”.
2 In contrast to blind or delegated quantum computation where some interaction
between client and server is usually required, see Sect. 1.2 for references.
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decryption function of the classical FHE scheme. This relation turns out to be
very convenient, as classical FHE schemes are often optimized with respect to the
complexity of the decryption operation (in order to make them bootstrappable).
As a concrete example, if we instantiate our scheme with the classical FHE scheme
by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11], each evaluation gadget of our scheme
consists of a number of qubits which is polynomial in the security parameter.
In TP, we require exactly one evaluation gadget for every T gate that
we would like to evaluate homomorphically. Intuitively, after a T gate is per-
formed on a one-time-pad encrypted qubit XaZb|ψ〉, the result might contain an
unwanted phase Pa depending on the key a with which the qubit was encrypted,
since T XaZb|ψ〉 = PaXaZbT |ψ〉. Obviously, the evaluator is not allowed to know
the key a. Instead, he holds an encryption a˜ of the key, produced by a classi-
cal FHE scheme. The evaluator can teleport the encrypted qubit “through the
gadget” [GC99] in a way that depends on a˜, in order to remove the unwanted
phase. In more detail, the quantum part of the gadget consists of a number of
EPR pairs which are prepared in a way that depends on the secret key of the
classical FHE scheme. Some classical information is provided with the gadget
that allows the evaluator to homomorphically update the encryption keys after
the teleportation steps. On a high level, the use of an evaluation gadget cor-
responds to a instantaneous non-local quantum computation3 where one party
holds the secret key of the classical FHE scheme, and the other party holds the
input qubit and a classical encryption of the key to the quantum one-time pad.
Together, this information determines whether an inverse phase gate P† needs to
be performed on the qubit or not. Very recent results by Speelman [Spe15] show
how to perform such computations with a bounded amount of entanglement.
These techniques are the crucial ingredients for our construction and are the
reason why the garden-hose complexity [BFSS13] of the decryption procedure of
the classical FHE is related to the size of our gadgets.
The quantum part of our evaluation gadget is strikingly simple, which pro-
vides a number of advantages. To start with, the evaluation of a T gate requires
only one gadget, and does not cause errors to accumulate on the quantum state.
The scheme is very compact in the sense that the state of the system after the
evaluation of a T gate has the same form as after the initial encryption, except
for any classical changes caused by the classical FHE evaluation. This kind of
compactness also implies that individual evaluation gadgets can be supplied “on
demand” by the holder of the secret key. Once an evaluator runs out of gadgets,
the secret key holder can simply supply more of them.
Furthermore, TP does not depend on a specific classical FHE scheme, hence
any advances in classical FHE can directly improve our scheme. Our require-
ments for the classical FHE scheme are quite modest: we only require the classical
scheme to have a space-efficient decryption procedure and to be secure against
quantum adversaries. In particular, no circular-security assumption is required.
3 This term is not related to the term ‘instantaneous quantum computation’ [SB08],
and instead first was used as a specific form of non-local quantum computation, one
where all parties have to act simultaneously.
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Since we supply at most a polynomial number of evaluation gadgets, our scheme
TP is leveled homomorphic by construction, and we can simply switch to a new
classical key after every evaluation gadget. In fact, the Clifford gates in the
quantum evaluation circuit only require additive operations from the classical
homomorphic scheme, while each T gate needs a fixed (polynomial) number of
multiplications. Hence, we do not actually require fully homomorphic classical
encryption, but leveled fully homomorphic schemes suffice.
Finally, circuit privacy in the passive setting almost comes for free. When
wanting to hide which circuit was evaluated on the data, the evaluating party
can add an extra randomization layer to the output state by applying his own
one-time pad. We show that if the classical FHE scheme has the circuit-privacy
property, then this extra randomization completely hides the circuit from the
decrypting party. This is not unique to our specific scheme: the same is true
for CL.
In terms of applications, our construction can be appreciated as a constant-
round scheme for blind delegated quantum computation, using computational
assumptions. The server can evaluate a universal quantum circuit on the
encrypted input, consisting of the client’s quantum input and a (classical)
description of the client’s circuit. In this context, it is desirable to minimize
the quantum resources needed by the client. We argue that our scheme can still
be used for constant-round blind delegated quantum computation if we limit
either the client’s quantum memory or the types of quantum operations the
client can perform.
As another application, we can instantiate our construction with a classical
FHE scheme that allows for distributed key generation and decryption amongst
different parties that all hold a share of the secret key [AJLA+12]. In that case,
it is likely that our techniques can be adapted to perform multiparty quantum
computation [BCG+06] in the semi-honest case. However, the focus of this article
lies on the description and security proof of the new construction, and more
concrete applications are the subject of upcoming work.
1.2 Related Work
Early classical FHE schemes were limited in the sense that they could not facili-
tate arbitrary operations on the encrypted data: some early schemes only imple-
mented a single operation (addition or multiplication) [RSA78,GM84,Pai99];
later on it became possible to combine several operations in a limited way
[BGN05,GHV10,SYY99]. Gentry’s first fully homomorphic encryption scheme
[Gen09] relied on several non-standard computational assumptions. Subsequent
work [BGV12,BV11] has relaxed these assumptions or replaced them with more
conventional assumptions such as the hardness of learning with errors (LWE),
which is believed to be hard also for quantum attackers. It is impossible to com-
pletely get rid of computational assumptions for a classical FHE scheme, since
the existence of such a scheme would imply the existence of an information-
theoretically secure protocol for private information retrieval (PIR) [KO97] that
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breaks the lower bound on the amount of communication required for that task
[CKGS98,Fil12].
While quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) is closely related to
the task of blind or delegated quantum computation [Chi05,BFK09,ABOE10,
VFPR14,FBS+14,Bro15a,Lia15], QFHE does not allow interaction between the
client and the server during the computation. Additionally, in QFHE, the server
is allowed to choose which unitary it wants to apply to the (encrypted) data.
Yu et al. [YPDF14] showed that perfectly information-theoretically secure
QFHE is not possible unless the size of the encryption grows exponentially in the
input size. Thus, any scheme that attempts to achieve information-theoretically
secure QFHE has to leak some proportion of the input to the server [AS06,
RFG12] or can only be used to evaluate a subset of all unitary transformations
on the input [RFG12,Lia13,TKO+14]. Like the multiplication operation is hard
in the classical case, the hurdle in the quantum case seems to be the evaluation
of non-Clifford gates. A recent result by Ouyang et al. provides information-
theoretic security for circuits with at most a constant number of non-Clifford
operations [OTF15].
Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] proposed two schemes that achieve homo-
morphic encryption for nontrivial sets of quantum circuits. Instead of trying
to achieve information-theoretic security, they built their schemes based on a
classical FHE scheme and hence any computational assumptions on the classi-
cal scheme are also required for the quantum schemes. Computational assump-
tions allow bypassing the impossibility result from [YPDF14] and work toward
a (quantum) fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Both of the schemes presented in [BJ15] are extensions of the scheme
CL described in Sect. 1.1. These two schemes use different methods to implement
the evaluation of a T gate, which we briefly discuss here. In the EPR scheme,
some entanglement is accumulated in a special register during every evaluation
of a T gate, and stored there until it can be resolved in the decryption phase.
Because of this accumulation, the complexity of the decryption function scales
(quadratically) with the number of T gates in the evaluated circuit, thereby
violating the compactness requirement of QFHE. The scheme AUX also extends
CL, but handles T gates in a different manner. The evaluator is supplied with
auxiliary quantum states, stored in the evaluation key, that allow him to evalu-
ate T gates and immediately remove any error that may have occurred. In this
way, the decryption procedure remains very efficient and the scheme is compact.
Unfortunately, the required auxiliary states grow doubly exponentially in size
with respect to the T depth of the circuit, rendering AUX useful only for circuits
with constant T depth. Our scheme TP is related to AUX in that extra resources
for removing errors are stored in the evaluation key. In sharp contrast to AUX,
the size of the evaluation key in TP only grows linearly in the number of T gates
in the circuit (and polynomially in the security parameter), allowing the scheme
to be leveled fully homomorphic. Since the evaluation of the other gates causes
no errors on the quantum state, no gadgets are needed for those; any circuit
containing polynomially many T gates can be efficiently evaluated.
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1.3 Structure of the Paper
We start by introducing some notation in Sect. 2 and presenting the necessary
preliminaries on quantum computation, (classical and quantum) homomorphic
encryption, and the garden-hose model which is essential to the most-general
construction of the gadgets. In Sect. 3, we describe the scheme TP and show
that it is compact. The security proof of TP is somewhat more involved, and
is presented in several steps in Sect. 4, along with an informal description of a
circuit-private variant of the scheme. In Sect. 5, the rationale behind the quantum
gadgets is explained, and some examples are discussed to clarify the construction.
We conclude our work in Sect. 6 and propose directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum Computation
We assume the reader is familiar with the standard notions in the field of quan-
tum computation (for an introduction, see [NC00]). In this subsection, we only
mention the concepts that are essential to our construction.
The single-qubit Pauli group is, up to global phase, generated by the bit flip
and phase flip operations,
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
A Pauli operator on n qubits is simply any tensor product of n independent
single-qubit Pauli operators. All four single-qubit Pauli operators are of the
form XaZb with a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Here, and in the rest of the paper, we ignore the
global phase of a quantum state, as it is not observable by measurement.
The Clifford group on n qubits consists of all unitaries C that commute with
the Pauli group, i.e. the Clifford group is the normalizer of the Pauli group.
Since all Pauli operators are of the form Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn , this means
that C is a Clifford operator if for any a1, b1, . . . , an, bn ∈ {0, 1} there exist
a′1, b
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′
n ∈ {0, 1} such that (ignoring global phase):
C(Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn) = (Xa′1Zb′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xa′nZb′n)C.
All Pauli operators are easily verified to be elements of the Clifford group, and
the entire Clifford group is generated by
P =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, and CNOT =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦.
(See for example [Got98].) The Clifford group does not suffice to simulate arbi-
trary quantum circuits, but by adding any single non-Clifford gate, any quan-
tum circuit can be efficiently simulated with only a small error. As in [BJ15], we
choose this non-Clifford gate to be the T gate,
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T =
[
1 0
0 eiπ/4
]
.
Note that the T gate, because it is non-Clifford, does not commute with the
Pauli group. More specifically, we have TXaZb = PaXaZbT. It is exactly the
formation of this P gate that has proven to be an obstacle to the design of an
efficient quantum homomorphic encryption scheme.
We use |ψ〉 or |ϕ〉 to denote pure quantum states. Mixed states are denoted
with ρ or σ. Let Id denote the identity matrix of dimension d: this allows us to
write the completely mixed state as Id/d.
Define |Φ+〉 := 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) to be an EPR pair.
If X is a random variable ranging over the possible basis states B for a
quantum system, then let ρ(X) be the density matrix corresponding to X,
i.e. ρ(X) :=
∑
b ∈ B Pr[X = b]|b〉〈b|.
Applying a Pauli operator that is chosen uniformly at random results in a
single-qubit completely mixed state, since
∀ρ :
∑
a,b ∈ {0,1}
(
1
4
XaZbρ(XaZb)†
)
=
I2
2
This property is used in the construction of the quantum one-time pad : applying
a random Pauli XaZb to a qubit completely hides the content of that qubit to
anyone who does not know the key (a, b) to the pad. Anyone in possession of the
key can decrypt simply by applying XaZb again.
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
This subsection provides the definitions of (classical and quantum) homomorphic
encryption schemes, and the security conditions for such schemes. In the current
work, we only consider homomorphic encryption in the public-key setting. For
a more thorough treatment of these concepts, and how they can be transferred
to the symmetric-key setting, see [BJ15].
The Classical Setting. A classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE con-
sists of four algorithms: key generation, encryption, evaluation, and decryption.
The key generator produces three keys: a public key and evaluation key, both of
which are publicly available to everyone, and a secret key which is only revealed
to the decrypting party. Anyone in possession of the public key can encrypt the
inputs x1, . . . , x, and send the resulting ciphertexts c1, . . . , c to an evaluator
who evaluates some circuit C on them. The evaluator sends the result to a party
that possesses the secret key, who should be able to decrypt it to C(x1, . . . , x).
More formally, HE consists of the following four algorithms which run in
probabilistic polynomial time in terms of their input and parameters [BV11]:
(pk , evk , sk) ← HE.KeyGen(1κ)] where κ ∈ N is the security parameter. Three
keys are generated: a public key pk , which can be used for the encryption of
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messages; a secret key sk used for decryption; and an evaluation key evk that
may aid in evaluating the circuit on the encrypted state. The keys pk and
evk are announced publicly, while sk is kept secret.
c ← HE.Encpk (x) for some one-bit message x ∈ {0, 1}. This probabilistic proce-
dure outputs a ciphertext c, using the public key pk .
c′ ← HE.EvalCevk (c1, . . . , c) uses the evaluation key to output some ciphertext c′
which decrypts to the evaluation of circuit C on the decryptions of c1, . . . , c.
We will often think of Eval as an evaluation of a function f instead of some
canonical circuit for f , and write HE.Evalfevk (c1, . . . , c) in this case.
x′ ← HE.Decsk (c) outputs a message x′ ∈ {0, 1}, using the secret key sk .
In principle, HE.Encpk can only encrypt single bits. When encrypting an n-bit
message x ∈ {0, 1}n, we encrypt the message bit-by-bit, applying the encryption
procedure n times. We sometimes abuse the notation HE.Encpk (x) to denote this
bitwise encryption of the string x.
For HE to be a homomorphic encryption scheme, we require correctness in
the sense that for any circuit C, there exists a negligible4 function η such that,
for any input x,
Pr[HE.Decsk (HE.EvalCevk (HE.Encpk (x))) 	= C(x)] ≤ η(κ).
In this article, we assume for clarity of exposition that classical schemes HE are
perfectly correct, and that it is possible to immediately decrypt after encrypting
(without doing any evaluation).
Another desirable property is compactness, which states that the complexity
of the decryption function should not depend on the size of the circuit: a scheme
is compact if there exists a polynomial p(κ) such that for any circuit C and any
ciphertext c, the complexity of applying HE.Dec to the result of HE.EvalC(c) is
at most p(κ).
A scheme that is both correct for all circuits and compact, is called fully
homomorphic. If it is only correct for a subset of all possible circuits (e.g. all
circuits with no multiplication gates) or if it is not compact, it is considered
to be a somewhat homomorphic scheme. Finally, a leveled fully homomorphic
scheme is (compact and) homomorphic for all circuits up to a variable depth L,
which is supplied as an argument to the key generation function [Vai11].
We will use the notation x˜ to denote the result of running HE.Encpk (x): that
is, Decsk (x˜) = x with overwhelming probability. In our construction, we will
often deal with multiple classical key sets (pk i, sk i, evk i)i ∈ I indexed by some
set I. In that case, we use the notation x˜[i] to denote the result of HE.Encpki(x),
in order to avoid confusion. Here, pk i does not refer to the ith bit of the public
key: in case we want to refer to the ith bit of some string s, we will use the
notation s[i].
When working with multiple key sets, it will often be necessary to transform
an already encrypted message x˜[i] into an encryption x˜[j] using a different key
4 A negligible function η is a function such that for every positive integer d, η(n) <
1/nd for big enough n.
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set j 	= i. To achieve this transformation, we define the procedure HE.Reci→j
that can always be used for this recryption task as long as we have access to an
encrypted version s˜k i
[j]
of the old secret key sk i. Effectively, HE.Reci→j homo-
morphically evaluates the decryption of x˜[i]:
HE.Reci→j(x˜[i]) := HE.EvalHE.Decevkj
(
s˜k i
[j]
,HE.Encpkj (x˜
[i])
)
.
The Quantum Setting. A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE,
as defined in [BJ15], is a natural extension of the classical case, and differs from
it in only a few aspects. The secret and public keys are still classical, but the
evaluation key is allowed to be a quantum state. This means that the evalua-
tion key is not necessarily reusable, and can be consumed during the evaluation
procedure. The messages to be encrypted are qubits instead of bits, and the
evaluator should be able to evaluate quantum circuits on them.
All definitions given above carry over quite naturally to the quantum setting
(see also [BJ15]):
(pk , ρevk , sk) ← QHE.KeyGen(1κ) where κ ∈ N is the security parameter. In
contrast to the classical case, the evaluation key is a quantum state.
σ ← QHE.Encpk (ρ) produces, for every valid public key pk and input state ρ
from some message space, to a quantum cipherstate σ in some cipherspace.
σ′ ← QHE.EvalCρevk (σ) represents the evaluation of a circuit C. If C requires n
input qubits, then σ should be a product of n cipherstates. The evaluation
function maps it to a product of n′ states in some output space, where n′
is the number of qubits that C would output. The evaluation key ρevk is
consumed in the process.
ρ′ ← QHE.Decsk (σ′) maps a single state σ′ from the output space to a quantum
state ρ′ in the message space. Note that if the evaluation procedure QHE.Eval
outputs a product of n′ states, then QHE.Dec needs to be run n′ times.
The decryption procedure differs from the classical definition in that we require
the decryption to happen subsystem-by-subsystem: this is fundamentally differ-
ent from the more relaxed notion of indivisible schemes [BJ15] where an auxiliary
quantum register may be built up for the entire state, and the state can only be
decrypted as a whole. In this work, we only consider the divisible definition.
Quantum Security. The notion of security that we aim for is that of indistin-
guishability under chosen-plaintext attacks, where the attacker may have quan-
tum computational powers (q-IND-CPA). This security notion was introduced in
[BJ15, Definition 3.3] (see [GHS15] for a similar notion of the security of classical
schemes against quantum attackers) and ensures semantic security [ABF+16].
We restate it here for completeness.
Definition 1 [BJ15]. The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment with
respect to a scheme QHE and a quantum polynomial-time adversary A =
(A1,A2), denoted by PubK
cpa
A ,QHE(κ), is defined by the following procedure:
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1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρevk).
2. Adversary A1 is given (pk, ρevk) and outputs a quantum state on M ⊗ E.
3. For r ∈ {0, 1}, let Ξcpa,rQHE : D(M) → D(C) be: Ξcpa,0QHE (ρ) = QHE.Encpk(|0〉〈0|)
and Ξcpa,1QHE (ρ) = QHE.Encpk(ρ). A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξcpa,rQHE
is applied to the state in M (the output being a state in C).
4. Adversary A2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r′ = r and 0 otherwise. In
case r = r′, we say that A wins the experiment.
Fig. 1. The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment PubKcpaA ,QHE(κ). Double lines
represent classical information flow, and single lines represent quantum information
flow. The adversary A is split up into two separate algorithms A1 and A2, which share
a working memory represented by the quantum state in register E . [BJ15, reproduced
with permission of the authors]
The game PubKcpaA ,QHE(κ) is depicted in Fig. 1. Informally, the challenger ran-
domly chooses whether to encrypt some message, chosen by the adversary, or
instead to encrypt the state |0〉〈0|. The adversary has to guess which of the two
happened. If he cannot do so with more than negligible advantage, the encryp-
tion procedure is considered to be q-IND-CPA secure:
Definition 2 [BJ15, Definition 3.3]. A (classical or quantum) homomorphic
encryption scheme S is q-IND-CPA secure if for any quantum polynomial-time
adversary A = (A1,A2) there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[PubKcpaA ,S(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ).
Analogously to PubKcpaA ,S(κ), in the game PubK
cpa−mult
A ,S (κ), the adversary can
give multiple messages to the challenger, which are either all encrypted, or all
replaced by zeros. Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] show that these notions of secu-
rity are equivalent.
2.3 Garden-Hose Complexity
The garden-hose model is a model of communication complexity which was intro-
duced by Buhrman et al. [BFSS13] to study a protocol for position-based quan-
tum cryptography. The model recently saw new use, when Speelman [Spe15] used
it to construct new protocols for the task of instantaneous non-local quantum
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computation, thereby breaking a wider class of schemes for position-based quan-
tum cryptography. (Besides the garden-hose model, this construction used tools
from secure delegated computation. These techniques were first used in the set-
ting of instantaneous non-local quantum computation by Broadbent [Bro15b].)
We will not explain the garden-hose model thoroughly, but instead give a
short overview. The garden-hose model involves two parties, Alice with input
x and Bob with input y, that jointly want to compute a function f . To do
this computation, they are allowed to use garden hoses to link up pipes that
run between them, one-to-one, in a way which depends on their local inputs.
Alice also has a water tap, which she connects to one of the pipes. Whenever
f(x, y) = 0, the water has to exit at an open pipe on Alice’s side, and whenever
f(x, y) = 1 the water should exit on Bob’s side.
The applicability of the garden-hose model to our setting stems from a close
correspondence between protocols in the garden-hose model and teleporting a
qubit back-and-forth; the ‘pipes’ correspond to EPR pairs and the ‘garden hoses’
can be translated into Bell measurements. Our construction of the gadgets in
Sect. 5.2 will depend on the number of pipes needed to compute the decryption
function HE.Dec of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme. It will
turn out that any log-space computable decryption function allows for efficiently
constructable polynomial-size gadgets.
3 The TP Scheme
Our scheme TP (for teleportation) is an extension of the scheme CL presented
in [BJ15]: the quantum state is encrypted using a quantum one-time pad, and
Clifford gates are evaluated simply by performing the gate on the encrypted
state and then homomorphically updating the encrypted keys to the pad. The
new scheme TP, like AUX, includes additional resource states (gadgets) in the
evaluation key. These gadgets can be used to immediately correct any P errors
that might be present after the application of a T gate. The size of the evaluation
key thus grows linearly with the upper bound to the number of T gates in the
circuit: for every T gate the evaluation key contains one gadget, along with some
classical information on how to use that gadget.
3.1 Gadget
In this section we only give the general form of the gadget, which suffices to prove
security. The explanation on how to construct these gadgets, which depend on
the decryption function of the classical homomorphic scheme HE.Dec, is deferred
to Sect. 5.
Recall that when a T gate is applied to the state XaZb|ψ〉, an unwanted P
error may occur since TXaZb = PaXaZbT. If a is known, this error can easily be
corrected by applying P† whenever a = 1. However, as we will see, the evaluating
party only has access to some encrypted version a˜ of the key a, and hence is not
able to decide whether or not to correct the state.
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We show how the key generator can create a gadget ahead of time that
corrects the state, conditioned on a, when the qubit PaXaZbT|ψ〉 is teleported
through it. The gadget will not reveal any information about whether or not a
P gate was present before the correction. Note that the value of a is completely
unknown to the key generator, so the gadget cannot depend on it. Instead, the
gadget will depend on the secret key sk , and the evaluator will use it in a way
that depends on a˜.
The intuition behind our construction is as follows. A gadget consists of a
set of fully entangled pairs that are crosswise linked up in a way that depends
on the secret key sk and the decryption function of the classical homomorphic
scheme HE. If the decryption function HE.Dec is simple enough, i.e. computable
in logarithmic space or by low-depth binary circuit, the size of this state is
polynomial in the security parameter.
Some of these entangled pairs have an extra inverse phase gate applied to
them. Note that teleporting any qubit XaZb|ψ〉 through, for example, (P† ⊗
I)|Φ+〉, effectively applies an inverse phase gate to the qubit, which ends up in
the state Xa
′
Zb
′
P†|ψ〉, where the new Pauli corrections a′,b′ depend on a,b and
the outcome of the Bell measurement.
When wanting to remove an unwanted phase gate, the evaluator of the circuit
teleports a qubit through this gadget state in a way which is specified by a˜. The
gadget state is constructed so that the qubit follows a path through this gadget
which passes an inverse phase gate if and only if HE.Decsk (a˜) equals 1. The Pauli
corrections can then be updated using the homomorphically-encrypted classical
information and the measurement outcomes.
Specification of Gadget. Assume HE.Dec is computable in space logarithmic
in the security parameter κ. In Sect. 5 we will show that there exists an effi-
cient algorithm TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk) which produces a gadget: a quantum state
Γpk′(sk) of the form as specified in this section.
The gadget will able to remove a single phase gate Pa, using only knowledge
of a˜, where a˜ decrypts to a under the secret key sk . The public key pk ′ is used
to encrypt all classical information which is part of the gadget.
The quantum part of the gadget consists of 2m qubits, with m
some number which is polynomial in the security parameter κ. Let
{(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)} be disjoint pairs in {1, 2, . . . , 2m}, and let p ∈
{0, 1}m be a string of m bits. Let g(sk) be a shorthand for the tuple of both of
these, together with the secret key sk ;
g(sk) := ({(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)}, p, sk).
The tuple g(sk) is the classical information that determines the structure of the
gadget as a function of the secret key sk . The length of g(sk) is not dependent
on the secret key: the number of qubits m and the size of sk itself are completely
determined by the choice of protocol HE and the security parameter κ.
For any bitstring x, z ∈ {0, 1}m, define the quantum state
γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
:=
m∏
i=1
Xx[i]Zz[i]
(
P†
)p[i]∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣
siti
Pp[i]Zz[i]Xx[i].
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(Here the single-qubit gates are applied to si, the first qubit of the entangled
pair.) This quantum state is a collection of maximally-entangled pairs of qubits,
some with an extra inverse phase gate applied, where the pairs are determined
by the disjoint pairs {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)} chosen earlier. The entangled
pairs have arbitrary Pauli operators applied to them, described by the bitstrings
x and z.
Note that, no matter the choice of gadget structure, averaging over all pos-
sible x, z gives the completely mixed state on 2m qubits,
1
22m
∑
x,z ∈ {0,1}m
γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
=
I22m
22m
.
This property will be important in the security proof; intuitively it shows that
these gadgets do not reveal any information about sk whenever x and z are
encrypted with a secure classical encryption scheme.
The entire gadget then is given by
Γpk′(sk) = ρ(HE.Encpk′
(
g(sk)
)
) ⊗ 1
22m
∑
x,z ∈ {0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpk′(x, z)) ⊗ γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
.
To summarize, the gadget consists of a quantum state γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
, instantiated
with randomly chosen x, z, the classical information denoting the random choice
of x, z, and the other classical information g(sk) which specifies the gadget. All
classical information is homomorphically encrypted with a public key pk ′.
Since this gadget depends on the secret key sk , simply encrypting this infor-
mation using the public key corresponding to sk would not be secure, unless we
assume that HE.Dec is circularly secure. In order to avoid the requirement of
circular security, we will always use a fresh, independent key pk ′ to encrypt this
information. The evaluator will have to do some recrypting before he is able to
use this information, but otherwise using independent keys does not complicate
the construction much. More details on how the evaluation procedure deals with
the different keys is provided in Sect. 3.4.
Usage of Gadget. The gadget is used by performing Bell measurements
between pairs of its qubits, together with an input qubit that needs a correction,
without having knowledge of the structure of the gadget.
The choice of measurements can be generated by an efficient (classical) algo-
rithm TP.GenMeasurement(a˜) which produces a list M containing m disjoint
pairs of elements in {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2m}. Here the labels 1 to 2m refer to the qubits
that make up a gadget and 0 is the label of the qubit with the possible P error.
The pairs represent which qubits will be connected through Bell measurements;
note that all but a single qubit will be measured according to M .
Consider an input qubit, in some arbitrary state Pa|ψ〉, i.e. the qubit has
an extra phase gate if a = 1. Let a˜ be an encrypted version of a, such that
a = HE.Decsk (a˜). Then the evaluator performs Bell measurements on Γpk ′(sk)
and the input qubit, according to M ← TP.GenMeasurement(a˜). By construction,
one out the 2m + 1 qubits is still unmeasured. This qubit will be in the state
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Xa
′
Zb
′ |ψ〉, for some a′ and b′, both of which are functions of the specification
of the gadget, the measurement choices which depend on a˜, and the outcomes
of the teleportation measurements. Also see Sect. 3.4 (and the full version of
this paper) for a more in-depth explanation of how the accompanying classical
information is updated.
Intuitively, the ‘path’ the qubit takes through the gadget state, goes
through one of the fully entangled pairs with an inverse phase gate whenever
HE.Decsk (a˜) = 1, and avoids all such pairs whenever HE.Decsk (a˜) = 0.
3.2 Key Generation
Using the classical HE.KeyGen as a subroutine to create multiple classical homo-
morphic keysets, we generate a classical secret and public key, and a classical-
quantum evaluation key that contains L gadgets, allowing evaluation of a circuit
containing up to L T gates. Every gadget depends on a different secret key, and
its classical information is always encrypted using the next public key. The key
generation procedure TP.KeyGen(1κ, 1L) is defined as follows:
1. For i = 0 to L: execute (pk i, sk i, evk i) ← HE.KeyGen(1κ) to obtain L + 1
independent classical homomorphic key sets.
2. Set the public key to be the tuple (pk i)Li=0.
3. Set the secret key to be the tuple (sk i)Li=0.
4. For i = 0 to L − 1: Run the procedure TP.GenGadgetpki+1(sk i) to create the
gadget Γpki+1(sk i) as described in Sect. 3.1.
5. Set the evaluation key to be the set of all gadgets created in the previous step
(including their encrypted classical information), plus the tuple (evk i)Li=0.
The resulting evaluation key is the quantum state
L−1⊗
i=0
(
Γpki+1(sk i) ⊗ |evk i〉〈evk i|
)
.
3.3 Encryption
The encryption procedure TP.Enc is identical to CL.Enc, using the first public
key pk0 for the encryption of the one-time-pad keys. We restate it here for
completeness.
Every single-qubit state σ is encrypted separately with a quantum one-time
pad, and the pad key is (classically) encrypted and appended to the quantum
encryption of σ, resulting in the classical-quantum state:
∑
a,b ∈ {0,1}
1
4
ρ(HE.Encpk0(a),HE.Encpk0(b)) ⊗ XaZbσZbXa.
3.4 Circuit Evaluation
Consider a circuit with n wires. The evaluation of the circuit on the encrypted
data is carried out one gate at a time.
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Recall that our quantum circuit is written using a gate set that consists of
the Clifford group generators {H,P,CNOT} and the T gate. A Clifford gate may
affect multiple wires at the same time, while T gates can only affect a single
qubit. Before the evaluation of a single gate U , the encryption of an n-qubit
state ρ is of the form
(
Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn)ρ (Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn).
The evaluating party holds the encrypted versions a˜1
[i], . . . , a˜n
[i] and
b˜1
[i]
, . . . , b˜n
[i]
, with respect to the ith key set for some i (initially, i = 0). The goal
is to obtain a quantum encryption of the state UρU†, such that the evaluator
can homomorphically compute the encryptions of the new keys to the quantum
one-time pad. If U is a Clifford gate, these encryptions will still be in the ith
key. If U is a T gate, then all encryptions are transferred to the (i + 1)th key
during the process.
– If U is a Clifford gate, we proceed exactly as in CL.Eval. The gate U is simply
applied to the encrypted qubit, and since U commutes with the Pauli group,
the evaluator only needs to update the encrypted keys in a straightforward
way. For a detailed description of this computation, also see the full version
of this paper, or e.g. [BJ15, AppendixC].
– If U = T, the evaluator should start out by applying a T gate to the appro-
priate wire w. Afterwards, the qubit at wire w is in the state
(
PawXawZbwT
)
ρw
(
T†XawZbw(P†)aw
)
.
In order to remove the P error, the evaluator uses one gadget Γpki+1(sk i)
from the evaluation key; he possesses the classical information a˜w
[i]
encrypted with the correct key to be able to compute measurements M ←
TP.GenMeasurement(a˜w
[i]) and performs the measurements on the pairs given
by M . Afterwards, using his own measurement outcomes, the classical infor-
mation accompanying the gadget (encrypted using pk i+1), and the recryp-
tions of a˜w
[i] and b˜w
[i]
into a˜w
[i+1] and b˜w
[i+1]
, the evaluator homomorphically
computes the new keys a˜′w
[i+1]
and b˜′w
[i+1]
. See also Fig. 2 and see the full
version of this paper for a detailed description of the update algorithm. After
these computations, the evaluator also recrypts the keys of all other wires
into the (i + 1)th key set.
At the end of the evaluation of some circuit C containing k T gates, the
evaluator holds a one-time-pad encryption of the state C|ψ〉, together with the
keys to the pad, classically encrypted in the kth key. The last step is to recrypt
(in L − k steps) this classical information into the Lth (final) key. Afterwards,
the quantum state and the key encryptions are sent to the decrypting party.
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Fig. 2. The homomorphic evaluation of the (i+1)th T gate of the circuit. The gadget
is consumed during the process. After the use of the gadget, the evaluator encrypts his
own classical information (including measurement outcomes) in order to use it in the
homomorphic computation of the new keys. HE.Eval evaluates this fairly straightfor-
ward computation that consists mainly of looking up values in a list and adding them
modulo 2. Note that s˜k i
[i+1]
, needed for the recryption procedures, is contained in the
evaluation key.
3.5 Decryption
The decryption procedure is identical to CL.Dec. For each qubit, HE.DecskL is run
twice in order to retrieve the keys to the quantum pad. The correct Pauli operator
can then be applied to the quantum state in order to obtain the desired state C|ψ〉.
The decryption procedure is fairly straightforward, and its complexity does
not depend on the circuit that was evaluated. This is formalized in a compactness
theorem for the TP scheme:
Theorem 1. If HE is compact, then TP is compact.
Proof. Note that because the decryption only involves removing a one-time pad
from the quantum ciphertext produced by the circuit evaluation, this decryption
can be carried out a single qubit at a time. By compactness of HE, there exists a
polynomial p(κ) such that for any function f , the complexity of applying HE.Dec
to the output of HE.Evalf is at most p(κ). Since the keys to the quantum one-time
pad of any wire w are two single bits encrypted with the classical HE scheme,
decrypting the keys for one wire requires at most 2p(κ) steps. Obtaining the
qubit then takes at most two steps more for (conditionally) applying Xaw and
Zbw . The total number of steps is polynomial in κ and independent of C, so we
conclude that TP is compact. unionsq
4 Security of TP
In order to guarantee the privacy of the input data, we need to argue that
an adversary that does not possess the secret key cannot learn anything about
the data with more than negligible probability. To this end, we show that TP
is q-IND-CPA secure, i.e. no polynomial-time quantum adversary can tell the
difference between an encryption of a real message and an encryption of |0〉〈0|,
even if he gets to choose the message himself (recall the definition of q-IND-CPA
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security from Sect. 2.2). Like in the security proofs in [BJ15], we use a reduction
argument to relate the probability of being able to distinguish between the two
encryptions to the probability of winning an indistinguishability experiment for
the classical HE, which we already know to be small. The aim of this section is
to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then TP is q-IND-CPA secure for
circuits containing up to polynomially (in κ) many T gates.
In order to prove Theorem2, we first prove that an efficient adversary’s per-
formance in the indistinguishability game is only negligibly different whether
or not he receives a real evaluation key with real gadgets, or just a completely
mixed quantum state with encryptions of 0’s accompanying them (Corollary 1).
Then we argue that without the evaluation key, an adversary does not receive
more information than in the indistinguishability game for the scheme CL, which
has already been shown to be q-IND-CPA secure whenever HE is.
We start with defining a sequence of variations on the TP scheme. For  ∈
{0, . . . , L}, let TP() be identical to TP, except for the key generation procedure:
TP().KeyGen replaces, for every i ≥ , all classical information accompanying
the ith gadget with the all-zero string before encrypting it. For any number i,
define the shorthand
gi := g(sk i).
As seen in Sect. 3.1, the length of the classical information does not depend on
sk i itself, so a potential adversary cannot gain any information about sk i just
from this encrypted string. In summary,
TP().KeyGen(1κ, 1L) :=
L−1⊗
i =0
|evk i〉〈evk i| ⊗
−1⊗
i =0
Γpki+1(sk i)⊗
L−1⊗
i = 
(
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
|gi|))⊗
1
22m
∑
x,z∈{0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m)) ⊗ γx,z(gi)
)
.
Intuitively, one can view TP() as the scheme that provides only  usable
gadgets in the evaluation key. Note that TP(L) = TP, and that in TP(0), only
the classical evaluation keys remain, since without the encryptions of the classical
x and z, the quantum part of the gadget is just the completely mixed state. That
is, we can rewrite the final line of the previous equation as
1
22m
∑
x,z ∈ {0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m)) ⊗ γx,z(gi)
= ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m)) ⊗ I22m
22m
. (1)
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With the definitions of the new schemes, we can lay out the steps to prove
Theorem2 in more detail. First, we show that in the quantum CPA indistin-
guishability experiment, any efficient adversary interacting with TP() only has
negligible advantage over an adversary interacting with TP(−1), i.e. the scheme
where the classical information g−1 is removed (Lemma 1). By iteratively apply-
ing this argument, we are able to argue that the advantage of an adversary who
interacts with TP(L) over one who interacts with TP(0) is also negligible (Corol-
lary 1). Finally, we conclude the proof by arguing that TP(0) is q-IND-CPA secure
by comparison to the CL scheme.
Lemma 1. Let 0 <  ≤ L. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then for any quantum
polynomial-time adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible function η
such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) = 1] − Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)(κ) = 1] ≤ η(κ).
Proof. The difference between schemes TP() and TP(−1) lies in whether the
gadget state γx−1,z−1(g−1) is supplemented with its classical information
g˜−1, x˜−1, z˜−1, or just with an encryption of 0|g−1|+2m.
Let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary for the game PubK
cpa
A ,TP()
(κ). We will
define an adversary A ′ = (A ′1 ,A
′
2) for PubK
cpa−mult
A ′,HE (κ) that will either simulate
the game PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) or PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)(κ). Which game is simulated will
depend on some s ∈R {0, 1} that is unknown to A ′ himself. Using the assump-
tion that HE is q-IND-CPA secure, we are able to argue that A ′ is unable
to recognize which of the two schemes was simulated, and this fact allows us
to bound the difference in success probabilities between the security games of
TP() and TP(−1). The structure of this proof is very similar to e.g. Lemma 5.3
in [BJ15]. The adversary A ′ acts as follows (see also Fig. 3):
A ′1 takes care of most of the key generation procedure: he gen-
erates the classical key sets 0 through  − 1 himself, generates
the random strings x0, z0, . . . , x−1, z−1, and constructs the gadgets
γx0,z0(g0), . . . , γx−1,z−1(g−1) and their classical information g0, . . . , g−1. He
encrypts the classical information using the appropriate public keys. Only
g−1, x−1 and z−1 are left unencrypted: instead of encrypting these strings
himself using pk , A ′1 sends the strings for encryption to the challenger.
Whether the challenger really encrypts g−1, x−1 and z−1 or replaces the
strings with a string of zeros, determines which of the two schemes is simu-
lated. A ′ is unaware of the random choice of the challenger.
The adversary A ′1 also generates the extra padding inputs that correspond
to the already-removed gadgets  up to L − 1. Since these gadgets consist
of all-zero strings encrypted with independently chosen public keys that are
not used anywhere else, together with a completely mixed quantum state (as
shown in Eq. 1), the adversary can generate them without needing any extra
information.
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A ′2 feeds the evaluation key and public key, just generated by A
′
1 , to A1 in order
to obtain a chosen message M (plus the auxiliary state E). He then picks a
random r ∈R {0, 1} and erases M if and only if r = 0. He encrypts the result
according to the TP.Enc procedure (using the public key (pk i)Li=0 received
from A ′1), and gives the encrypted state, plus E , to A2, who outputs r′ in
an attempt to guess r. A ′2 now outputs 1 if and only if the guess by A was
correct, i.e. r ≡ r′.
Because HE is q-IND-CPA secure, the probability that A ′ wins
PubKcpa−multA ′,HE (κ), i.e. that s
′ ≡ s, is at most 12 +η′(κ) for some negligible function
η′. There are two scenarios in which A ′ wins the game:
– s = 1 and A guesses r correctly: If s = 1, the game that is being simulated is
PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ). If A wins the simulated game (r ≡ r′), then A ′ will correctly
output s′ = 1. (If A loses, then A ′ outputs 0, and loses as well).
– s = 0 and A does not guess r correctly: If s = 0, the game that is being
simulated is PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)(κ). If A loses the game (r 	≡ r′), then A ′ will
correctly output s′ = 0. (If A wins, then A ′ outputs 1 and loses).
From the above, we conclude that
Pr[s = 1] · Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) = 1] + Pr[s = 0] · Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)
(κ) = 0] ≤ 1
2
+ η
′
(κ)
⇔ 1
2
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) = 1] +
1
2
(
1 − Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)
(κ) = 1]
)
≤ 1
2
+ η
′
(κ)
⇔ Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) = 1] − Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(−1)
(κ) = 1] ≤ 2η′(κ)
Set η(κ) := 2η′(κ), and the proof is complete. unionsq
By applying Lemma1 iteratively, L times in total, we can conclude that the
difference between TP(L) and TP(0) is negligible, because the sum of polynomially
many negligible functions is still negligible:
Corollary 1. If L is polynomial in κ, then for any quantum polynomial-time
adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(L)
(κ) = 1] − Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(0)
(κ) = 1] ≤ η(κ).
Using Corollary 1, we can finally prove the q-IND-CPA security of our scheme
TP = TP(L).
Proof of Theorem 2. The scheme TP(0) is very similar to CL in terms of its key
generation and encryption steps. The evaluation key consists of several classical
evaluation keys, plus some completely mixed states and encryptions of 0 which
we can safely ignore because they do not contain any information about the
encrypted message. In both schemes, the encryption of a qubit is a quantum
one-time pad together with the encrypted keys. The only difference is that in
TP(0), the public key and evaluation key form a tuple containing, in addition
to pk0 and evk0 which are used for the encryption of the quantum one-time
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Fig. 3. A strategy for the game PubKcpa−multA ′,HE (κ), using an adversary A for
PubKcpa
A ,TP()
(κ) as a subroutine. All the wires that form an input to A1 together form
the evaluation key and public key for TP() or TP(−1), depending on s. Note that
Ξcpa,rTP = Ξ
cpa,r
TP()
= Ξcpa,r
TP(−1) , so A
′
2 can run either one of these independently of s (i.e.
without having to query the challenger). The ‘create padding’ subroutine generates
dummy gadgets for  up to L − 1, as described in the definition of A1.
pad, a list of public/evaluation keys that are independent of the encryption.
These keys do not provide any advantage (in fact, the adversary could have
generated them himself by repeatedly running HE.KeyGen(1κ, 1L)). Therefore,
we can safely ignore these keys as well.
In [BJ15, Lemma5.3], it is shown that CL is q-IND-CPA secure. Because of
the similarity between CL and TP(0), the exact same proof shows that TP(0) is
q-IND-CPA secure as well, that is, for any A there exists a negligible function
η′ such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(0)
(κ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ).
Combining this result with Corollary 1, it follows that
Pr[PubKcpaA ,TP(κ) = 1] ≤ Pr[PubKcpaA ,TP(0)(κ) = 1] + η(κ)
≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ) + η(κ).
Since the sum of two negligible functions is itself negligible, we have proved
Theorem2.
unionsq
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4.1 Circuit Privacy
The scheme TP as presented above ensures the privacy of the input data. It does
not guarantee, however, that whoever generates the keys, encrypts, and decrypts
cannot gain information about the circuit C that was applied to some input ρ by
the evaluator. Obviously, the output value CρC† often reveals something about
the circuit C, but apart from this necessary leakage of information, one may
require a (quantum) homomorphic encryption scheme to ensure circuit privacy
in the sense that an adversary cannot statistically gain any information about C
from the output of the evaluation procedure that it could not already gain from
CρC† itself.
We claim that circuit privacy for TP in the semi-honest setting (i.e. against
passive adversaries5) can be obtained by modifying the scheme only slightly,
given that the classical encryption scheme has the circuit privacy property.
Theorem 3. If HE has circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting, then TP can
be adapted to a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit privacy.
Proof Sketch. If the evaluator randomizes the encryption of the output data by
applying a quantum one-time pad to the (already encrypted) result of the evalu-
ation, the keys themselves are uniformly random and therefore do not reveal any
information about what circuit was evaluated. The evaluator can then proceed
to update the classical encryptions of those keys accordingly, and by the circuit
privacy of the classical scheme, the resulting encrypted keys will also contain no
information about the computations performed. Because of space constraints,
the full detailed proof is given in the full version of this paper. unionsq
5 Constructing the Gadgets
In this section we will first show how to construct gadgets that have polyno-
mial size whenever the scheme HE has a decryption circuit with logarithmic
depth (i.e., the decryption function is in NC1). This construction will already
be powerful enough to instantiate TP with current classical schemes for homo-
morphic encryption, since these commonly have low-depth decryption circuits.
Afterwards, in Sect. 5.2, we will present a larger toolkit to construct gadgets,
which is efficient for a larger class of possible decryption functions. To illustrate
these techniques, we apply these tools to create gadgets for schemes that are
based on Learning With Errors (LWE). Finally, we will reflect on the possibility
of constructing these gadgets in scenarios where quantum power is limited.
5.1 For Log-Depth Decryption Circuits
The main tool for creating gadgets that encode log-depth decryption cir-
cuits comes from Barrington’s theorem: a classic result in complexity theory,
5 Note that there various ways to define passive adversaries in the quantum setting
[DNS10,BB14]. Here, we are considering adversaries that follow all protocol instruc-
tions exactly.
24 Y. Dulek et al.
which states that all boolean circuits of logarithmic depth can be encoded as
polynomial-sized width-5 permutation branching programs. Every instruction of
such a branching program will be encoded as connections between five Bell pairs.
Definition 3. A width-k permutation branching program of length L on an
input x ∈ {0, 1}n is a list of L instructions of the form 〈i, σ1 , σ0 〉, for 1 ≤  ≤ L,
such that i ∈ [n], and σ1 and σ0 are elements of Sk, i.e., permutations of [k].
The program is executed by composing the permutations given by the instructions
1 through L, selecting σ1 if xi = 1 and selecting σ
0
 if xi = 0. The program
rejects if this product equals the identity permutation and accepts if it equals a
fixed k-cycle.
Since these programs have a very simple form, it came as a surprise when
they were proven to be quite powerful [Bar89].
Theorem 4 (Barrington [Bar89]). Every fan-in 2 boolean circuit C of depth d
can be simulated by a width-5 permutation branching program of length at most
4d.
Our gadget construction will consist of first transforming the decryption func-
tion HE.Dec into a permutation branching program, and then encoding this
permutation branching program as a specification of a gadget, as produced by
TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk), and usage instructions TP.GenMeasurement(a˜).
Theorem 5. Let HE.Decsk (a˜) be the decryption function of the classical homo-
morphic encryption scheme HE. If HE.Dec is computable by a boolean fan-in 2
circuit of depth O(log(κ)), where κ is the security parameter, then there exist
gadgets for TP of size polynomial in κ.
Proof. Our description will consist of three steps. First, we write HE.Dec as a
width-5 permutation branching program, of which the instructions alternately
depend on the secret key sk and on the ciphertext a˜. Secondly, we specify how
to transform these instructions into a gadget which almost works correctly, but
for which the qubit ends up at an unknown location. Finally, we complete the
construction by executing the inverse program, so that the qubit ends up at a
known location.
The first part follows directly from Barrington’s theorem. The effective input
of HE.Dec can be seen as the concatenation of the secret key sk and the cipher-
text a˜. Since by assumption the circuit is of depth O(log κ), there exists width-5
permutation branching program P of length L = κO(1), with the following prop-
erties. We write
P = (〈i1, σ11 , σ01〉, 〈i2, σ12 , σ02〉, . . . , 〈iL, σ1L, σ0L〉)
as the list of instructions of the width-5 permutation branching program. Without
loss of generality6, we can assume that the instructions alternately depend on bits
6 This can be seen by inserting dummy instructions that always perform the identity
permutation between any two consecutive instructions that depend on the same vari-
able. Alternatively, it would be possible to improve the construction by ‘multiplying
out’ consecutive instructions whenever they depend on the same variable.
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of a˜ and bits of sk . That is, the index i refers to a bit of a˜ if  is odd, and to a bit of
sk if  is even. There are L instructions in total, of which L/2 are odd-numbered
and L/2 are even.
The output of TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk), i.e., the list of pairs that defines the
structure of the gadget, will be created from the even-numbered instructions,
evaluated using the secret key sk . For every even-numbered  ≤ L, we con-
nect ten qubits in the following way. Suppose the th instruction evaluates
to some permutation σ := σ
ski
 . Label the 10 qubits of this part of the
gadget by 1,in, 2,in, . . . , 5,in and 1,out, 2,out, . . . , 5,out. These will correspond
to 5 EPR pairs, connected according to the permutation: (1,in, σ(1),out),
(2,in, σ(2),out), etc., up to (5,in, σ(5),out).
After the final instruction of the branching program, σL, also perform an
inverse phase gate P† on the qubits labeled as 2L,out, 3L,out, 4L,out, 5L,out. Exe-
cution of the gadget will teleport the qubit through one of these whenever a˜ = 1.
For this construction, TP.GenMeasurement(a˜) will be given by the odd
instructions, which depend on the bits of a˜. Again, for all odd  ≤ L, let
σ := σ
a˜i
 be the permutation given by the evaluation of instruction  on a˜. For
all  strictly greater than one, the measurement instructions will be: perform a
Bell measurement according to the permutation σ between the ‘out’ qubits of
the previous set, and the ‘in’ qubits of the next. The measurement pairs will
then be (1−1,out, σ(1),in), (2−1,out, σ(2),in), up to (5−1,out, σ(5),in).
For  = 1, there is no previous layer to connect to, only the input qubit. For
that, we add the measurement instruction (0, σ(1)1,in), where 0 is the label of
the input qubit.
By Barrington’s theorem, if HE.Decsk (a˜) = 0 then the product, say τ ,
of the permutations coming from the evaluated instructions equals the iden-
tity. In that case, consecutively applying these permutations on ‘1’, results
in the unchanged starting value, ‘1’. If instead the decryption would out-
put 1, the consecutive application results in another value in {2, 3, 4, 5},
because in that case, τ is a k-cycle. After teleporting a qubit through these
EPR pairs, with teleportation measurements chosen accordingly, the input
qubit will be present at τ(1)L,out, with an inverse phase gate if τ(1) is
unequal to 1.
The gadget constructed so far would correctly apply the phase gate, condi-
tioned on HE.Decsk (a˜), with one problem: afterward, the qubit is at a location
unknown to the user of the gadget, because the user cannot compute τ .
We fix this problem in the following way: execute the inverse branching pro-
gram afterwards. The entire construction is continued in the same way, but
the instructions of the inverse program are used. The inverse program can be
made from the original program by reversing the order of instructions, and then
for each permutation using its inverse permutation instead. The first inverse
instruction is 〈iL, (σ1L)−1, (σ0L)−1〉, then 〈iL−1, (σ1L−1)−1, (σ0L−1)−1〉, with final
instruction 〈i1, (σ11)−1, (σ01)−1〉. One small detail is that iL is used twice in a
row, breaking the alternation; the user of the gadget can simply perform the
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Fig. 4. Structure of the (first half of the) gadget, with measurements, coming from
the 5-permutation branching program for the OR function on the input (0, 0). The
example program’s instructions are displayed above the permutations. The solid lines
correspond to Bell measurements, while the wavy lines represent EPR pairs.
measurements that correspond to the identity permutation e in between, since
(σ0L)(σ
0
L)
−1 = (σ1L)(σ
1
L)
−1 = e.
After having repeated the construction with the inverse permutation branch-
ing program, the qubit is guaranteed to be at the location where it originally
started: σ1(1) of the final layer of five qubits – that will then be the corrected
qubit which is the output of the gadget.
The total number of qubits which form the gadget, created from a width-5
permutation branching program of length L, of which the instructions alternate
between depending on a˜ and depending on sk , is 2 · (5L) = 10L. unionsq
Example. The OR function on two bits can be computed using a width-5 permu-
tation branching program of length 4, consisting of the following list of instruc-
tions:
1. 〈1, e, (12345)〉
2. 〈2, e, (12453)〉
3. 〈1, e, (54321)〉
4. 〈2, (14235), (15243)〉
As a simplified example, suppose the decryption function HE.Decsk (a˜) is
sk1 OR a˜1. Then, for one possible example set of values of a˜ and sk , half of
the gadget and measurements will be as given in Fig. 4. To complete this gadget,
the same construction is appended, reflected horizontally.
5.2 For Log-Space Computable Decryption Functions
Even though the construction based on Barrington’s theorem has enough power
for current classical homomorphic schemes, it is possible to improve on this con-
struction in two directions. Firstly, we extend our result to be able to handle
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a larger class of decryption functions: those that can be computed in logarith-
mic space, instead of only NC1. Secondly, for some specific decryption functions,
executing the construction of Sect. 5.1 might produce significantly larger gad-
gets than necessary. For instance, even for very simple circuits of depth log κ,
Barrington’s theorem produces programs of length κ2 — a direct approach can
often easily improve on the exponent of the polynomial. See also the garden-
hose protocols for equality [Mar14,CSWX14] and the majority function [KP14]
for examples of non-trivial protocols that are much more efficient than applying
Barrington’s theorem as a black box.
Theorem 6. Let HE.Decsk (a˜) be the decryption function of the classical homo-
morphic encryption scheme HE. If HE.Dec is computable by a Turing machine
that uses space O(log κ), where κ is the security parameter, then there exist gad-
gets for TP of size polynomial in κ.
A detailed explanation of how to construct a gadget for a log-space computa-
tion is given in the full version of this paper. All more-complicated constructions
use a different language than the direct encoding of the previous section: there
is a natural way of writing the requirements on the gadgets as a two-player task,
and then writing strategies for this task in the garden-hose model. Writing these
gadgets in terms of the garden-hose model, even though it adds a layer of com-
plexity to the construction, gives more insight into the structure of the gadgets,
and forms its original inspiration. We therefore sketch the link between log-space
computation and gadget construction within this framework.
Besides clarifying the log-space construction, viewing the gadget construction
as an instantiation of the garden-hose mode also makes it easier to construct gad-
gets for specific cases. Earlier work developed protocols in the garden-hose model
for several functions, see for instance [Spe11,BFSS13,KP14], and connections to
other models of computation. These results on the garden-hose model might
serve as building blocks to create more efficient gadgets for specific decoding
functions of classical homomorphic schemes, that are potentially much smaller
than those created as a result of following the general constructions of Theorem5
or 6.
The scheme by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11] is well-suited for our
construction, and its decryption function is representative for a much wider class
of schemes which are based on the hardness of Learning With Errors (LWE). As
an example, we construct gadgets that enable quantum homomorphic encryption
based on the BV11 scheme in the full version of our paper.
5.3 Constructing Gadgets Using Limited Quantum Resources
In a setting where a less powerful client wants to delegate some quantum compu-
tation to a more powerful server, it is important to minimize the amount of effort
required from the client. In delegated quantum computation, the complexity of
a protocol can be measured by, among other things, the total amount of com-
munication between client and server, the number of rounds of communication,
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and the quantum resources available to the client, such as possible quantum
operations and memory size.
We claim that TP gives rise to a three-round delegated quantum compu-
tation protocol in a setting where the client can perform only Pauli and swap
operations. TP.Enc and TP.Dec only require local application of Pauli opera-
tors to a quantum state, but TP.KeyGen is more involved because of the gadget
construction. However, when supplied with a set of EPR pairs from the server
(or any other untrusted source), the client can generate the quantum evaluation
key for TP using only Pauli and swap operations. Even if the server produces
some other state than the claimed list of EPR pairs, the client can prevent the
leakage of information about her input by encrypting the input with random
Pauli operations. More details are supplied in the appendix of the full version of
this paper.
Alternatively, TP can be regarded as a two-round delegated quantum compu-
tation protocol in a setting where the client can perform arbitrary Clifford oper-
ations, but is limited to a constant-sized quantum memory, given that HE.Dec is
in NC1. In that case, the gadgets can be constructed ten qubits at a time, by con-
structing the sets of five EPR pairs as specified in Sect. 5.1. By decomposing the
5-cycles into products of 2-cycles, the quantum memory can even be reduced to
only four qubits. The client sends these small parts of the gadgets to the server as
they are completed. Because communication remains one-way until all gadgets
have been sent, this can be regarded as a single round of communication.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the first quantum homomorphic encryption scheme TP that
is compact and allows evaluation of circuits with polynomially many T gates in
the security parameter, i.e. arbitrary polynomial-sized circuits. Assuming that
the number of wires involved in the evaluation circuit is also polynomially related
to the security parameter, we may consider TP to be leveled fully homomorphic.
The scheme is based on an arbitrary classical FHE scheme, and any computa-
tional assumptions needed for the classical scheme are also required for security
of TP. However, since TP uses the classical FHE scheme as a black box, any
FHE scheme can be plugged in to change the set of computational assumptions.
Our constructions are based on a new and interesting connection between
the area of instantaneous non-local quantum computation and quantum homo-
morphic encryption. Recent techniques developed by Speelman [Spe15], based
on the garden-hose model [BFSS13], have turned out to be crucial for our con-
struction of quantum gadgets which allow homomorphic evaluation of T gates
on encrypted quantum data.
6.1 Future Work
Since Yu et al. [YPDF14] showed that information-theoretically secure QFHE
is impossible (at least in the exact case), it is natural to wonder whether it
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is possible to construct a non-leveled QFHE scheme based on computational
assumptions. If such a scheme is not possible, can one find lower bounds on the
size of the evaluation key of a compact scheme? Other than the development
of more efficient QFHE schemes, one can consider the construction of QFHE
schemes with extra properties, such as circuit privacy against active adversaries.
It is also interesting to look at other cryptographic tasks that might be exe-
cuted using QFHE. In the classical world for example, multiparty computation
protocols can be constructed from fully homomorphic encryption [CDN01]. We
consider it likely that our new techniques will also be useful in other contexts
such as quantum indistinguishability obfuscation [AF16].
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